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In this article we explain the relatively successful performance of the EU in climate and energy 
governance by essentially two factors: (1) multi-level reinforcement and (2) the mobilization of 
economic interests at different levels of governance through low-carbon industrial policy. The article 
adds to the literature by further developing existing arguments on multi-level reinforcement in climate 
and energy policy and discussing the role of sub-national actors in this context. Multi-level 
governance is most advanced in the EU compared to other world regions and is actively harnessed for 
climate policy and the promotion of low-carbon development objectives by the European 
Commission. It represents a multi- impulse system, which fosters interactive learning from best 
practice and provides an opportunity structure for innovation and rapid diffusion. Moreover, the 
authors stress the point that economic co-benefits of climate protection have been successfully 
mobilized at all levels of governance, including the sub-national level, in recent times. As a result, 
sub-national levels of governance are beginning to assume an increasingly important role in 
reinforcing climate and energy governance, initially promoted at the national and EU level. This is 
illustrated by examples from both pioneer countries and laggards in terms of national climate and 
energy policy.  
  
1. Introduction  
Global climate governance can be conceived as governance across levels and sectors, as 
governance within a multi-level and multi-sectoral global system. This governance model has 
its origins in the European Union as well as in the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992 (Jänicke in this Special Issue). Multi-level climate governance means essentially to 
activate the dynamic potential of each level and the interaction between all levels to achieve a 
global mobilization of actors. Sectoral climate governance addresses the climate-related 
challenges and opportunities (or co-benefits) of different economic sectors within the logic of 
a “green industrial policy”.  
In this article we discuss the dynamic potential of both, of multi-level governance - with a 
particular focus on the sub-national level - and its close inter-relationship with sectoral 
governance. Our main hypothesis is that European leadership in climate governance is 
enabled by mobilizing economic interests in various sectors and across multiple levels of 
governance. We consider the EU to be the core of the global system of climate governance 
(see Jänicke in this SI). 
Schreurs and Tiberghien have proposed that multi-level reinforcement within this system of 
governance has played an important role in enabling Europe’s relative ambition in climate and 
energy policy compared to other large parties on the international scene. This concept of 
multi-level reinforcement is applied in this article to provide an analytical lens for 
understanding policy innovation within the European Union. It considers not only the 
dynamic interaction between the national and European level within the global system of 
multi-level climate governance but also includes the sub-national levels of policy-making. It 
is in this area that developments have been particularly dynamic in the recent past. Hence, 
while European level policy instruments, like the European Emission Trading System (ETS) 
may not be delivering the promised returns, they have unleashed a dynamic process of multi-
level reinforcement, extending to the sub-national levels. This can be observed even in 
member states like Poland, which are relatively weak players at the national level of climate 
governance. 
The paper argues that these vertical and horizontal dynamics of reinforcement within the 
European system of multi-level climate governance have been driven to a high degree by 
sectoral economic co-benefits. This is the field, where climate protection in terms of industrial 
policy has been relatively successful. Therefore the article also asks how economic interests 
are related to the multi-level system of climate governance. This is linked to a discussion of 
the changing nature of the sub-national level of governance and how it is contributing to 
multi-level reinforcement in European climate and energy governance.  
The article begins with a review of the literature on multi-level climate and energy 
governance and the role of multi-level reinforcement in that context. It then discusses the 
literature on green and low-carbon industrial policy, linking this to the dynamics of multi-
level reinforcement. Next the article provides an overview of climate policy achievements of 
the EU and places these in the context of relevant characteristics of the EU system of climate 
governance. It places particular emphasis on EU policy instruments targeting sub-national 
actors, highlighting their importance for supporting dynamics at the sub-national level. Then 
we propose that – parallel to processes of Europeanization - the sub-national level of 
European climate governance has increasingly evolved from a locus and enabler for 
grassroots, citizen-led climate and energy policy initiatives to an increasingly important arena 
of innovation and industrial policy and a key enabler of multi-level reinforcement. The article 
offers case examples from climate and energy policy in different European member states to 
illustrate its claims  
2. Climate governance across levels and sectors  
2.1.The relevance of the concept of “multi-level governance”  
Since its introduction in the early 1990s, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) has 
stimulated a broad research agenda, gaining strongly in popularity over the past 10 years (see 
Jänicke in this Special Issue). It was first used as a new approach to characterize the process 
of decision-making in the field of structural policy in the European Union, emphasizing 
parallel processes of decentralization and Europeanization (Marks, 1993). Later, it was 
broadened to also capture the broader theme in the governance debate that non-governmental 
actors and issue-specific coalitions and institutional arrangements play an increasingly 
important role in addressing societal challenges. This is important for the debate on multi-
level governance as these non-state actors do not necessarily align with the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the State’s administrative structure  (Hooghe and Marks, 2003).  
In addition, it has been suggested that the dispersion of governance across multiple 
jurisdictions is in fact “more efficient and normatively superior to the central state 
monopoly.” (Marks and Hooghe, 2004). This message is echoed by Ostrom for the field of 
global climate governance. According to her, such multi-level, multi-actor systems offer 
important benefits in terms of fostering innovation and learning and in achieving “more 
effective, equitable and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” (Ostrom, 2010: 552).  
In this article we start with the argument that the concept of MLG has become indispensable 
for understanding the dynamic nature of global climate governance. Although it is undisputed 
that effective climate protection requires a global response, such a response would be 
unthinkable without engagement at all levels of the global political system. Without active 
participation at each level of governance, the far-reaching economic and societal changes, 
which are needed to meet international climate targets, will not be forthcoming (Brondizio et 
al. 2009). Moreover, developments in the arena of international climate negotiations have 
made clear that a traditional top-down approach, based on a binding international climate 
agreement to be implemented and enforced in a hierarchical fashion does not offer a realistic 
solution (Stern et al. 2014). At the same time, many promising developments at different 
levels of governance have emerged and are demonstrating that more complex dynamics of 
governance, characterized by different forms of competition, cooperation, networking and 
mutual learning, are driving progress in climate policy. These include both non-traditional 
“horizontal” elements, like peer-to-peer learning or regulatory competition, and vertical 
processes of scaling-up and adoption of best-practices at higher levels of government 
(Kern/Bulkeley 2009). We regard the multi-level system of global climate governance as a 
“multi-impulse system” (Jänicke in this SI), where several climate governance impulses from 
different points of the system can have the same effect as a strong, centralized instrument 
(which is not always feasible). 
Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) have adopted such a dynamic and multi-polar perspective to 
help explain advances in climate policy within the European Union. They highlight the 
importance of multiple leadership opportunities in stimulating what they call “a dynamic 
process of competitive multilevel reinforcement among the different EU political poles within 
a context of decentralized governance” (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007: 26). Particular 
interests and opportunity structures in a number of member states have played a key role in 
driving EU climate action. Among other things, extending national policy innovations to the 
European Union has represented a strategy of member states to stabilize their national pioneer 
role, while creating a European market for domestic innovations in climate-friendly 
technologies. Rather than focusing on the architecture of Europe’s multi-level governance 
system (Biermann 2014, Jänicke in this Special Issue), this perspective highlights the dynamic 
process by which policy change has been realized and emphasizes the dynamic potential of 
the polycentric systems of governance.  
As alluded to above, the article published by Schreurs and Tiberghien in 2007 was followed 
by an article by Jordan et al. (2012), which presents a number of caveats to the hopeful 
perspective offered by Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007). They note challenges like the 
Commission’s relatively weak capacity for implementing its ambitious policy goals or – 
related to this – the narrow set of policy instruments at its disposal.  
Both articles present valid perspectives and point out important dimensions of Europe’s 
system of climate governance. Both focus on the interplay between the national and 
supranational levels within European multi-level climate governance. As pointed out above, 
the term MLG was originally coined to describe the twin processes of Europeanization and 
decentralization. Starting with the “Agenda 21” (1992), it has also been used to describe a 
new model of global sustainability governance with a strong focus on the local level but also 
on multi-sectoral economic development.  
This article returns to this original approach to global sustainability governance, arguing that 
sub-national levels of governance play an important role for understanding the dynamics of 
multi-level reinforcement in the European Union and beyond. It will show that sub-national 
politics and policies have played a distinct and evolving role in processes of multi-level 
reinforcement in European climate and energy governance and that this is closely related to 
the mobilization of sector-based economic benefits and interests.  
2.2. The local level in multi-level reinforcement 
In traditional perspectives on environmental policy making, sub-national levels of government 
are primarily viewed in terms of their roles in implementing and enforcing environmental 
regulations developed by national governments and possibly agreed to in the form of 
international treaties (Stewart, 1977; Swanson et al., 2001). However, with the emergence of 
the concept of sustainable development and its emphasis on local participation (Green and 
Chambers, 2006), this began to change gradually, culminating in the “local Agenda 21” 
process launched at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 (Rowe and Fudge, 2003). While the 
ultimate impact of the local Agenda 21 is difficult to measure, it is generally viewed as a 
successful measure for promoting awareness and participation of local civil society in the 
promotion of sustainable development (Barrett and Usui, 2002; Lafferty and Eckerberg, 
2009).  
At the same time, it is frequently pointed out that the local Agenda 21 was not particularly 
successful in fostering private sector involvement (Lafferty and Eckerberg, 2009; see also 
Jänicke in this Special Issue). In the field of climate and energy governance, this has begun to 
change over the past decade (Fuchs and Hinderer, 2014). Simultaneously, local level policies 
and initiatives are increasingly framed as potential drivers of competitiveness and economic 
development (OECD, 2008). The database of the Covenant of Mayors provides empirical 
evidence that in recent years, the climate policy process has mobilized strong economic 
interests at the local level, especially in the building sector (30% of the activities) and in local 
energy production. Among other things, private ownership of green power has emerged as a 
driver of change at the local level in several countries. In Germany, more than half of the 
green power installations are owned by private persons. Cities and local communities, often 
organized as networks (Kern / Bulkeley 2009), use national and European policies and 
incentives – whether regulations, subsidies or public procurement – to mobilize economic 
interests for climate-friendly technologies, such as renewable energy or low-energy buildings. 
The EU Directive on Energy Performance of Buildings, for instance, has stimulated a strong 
activity among local communities with pioneer cities such as Freiburg, Manchester, 
Copenhagen and Malmö playing an important role (REN21 2013).  
We argue that these changes can be understood as a new phase in a dynamic process of multi-
level reinforcement, in which sub-national levels of governance are beginning to assume an 
increasing role in reinforcing industrial policy, initially promoted at the European and national 
level.  
2.3 Sectoral governance: Climate and energy governance as industrial policy 
In the context of climate and energy governance, the mobilization of sector-based economic 
benefits has taken the form of technology-based innovation and industrial policy (OECD, 
2011a, 2011b; Soete, 2007). Contrary to the disappointing development of climate policy 
towards a legally binding international framework, climate policy as sector-based industrial 
policy has been fairly successful (IPCC, 2014: 1174-1178). While the concept of industrial 
policy has been the subject of substantial dispute in the past (Landesman 2015), there has 
been an important revival of industrial policy in recent years (Stiglitz / Lin 2013). 
Environment and climate policy have been strong drivers of this revival (Hallegatte et al. 
2013, Altenburg / Lütkenhorst 2015).  
Warwick has defined industrial policy as „…any type of intervention or government policy 
that attempts to improve the business environment or to alter the structure of economic 
activity toward sectors, technologies or tasks that are expected to offer better prospects for 
economic growth or societal welfare than would occur in the absence of such intervention, i.e. 
in the market equilibrium“ (Warwick 2012). „Green industrial policy“, according to Walz 
(2015), „aims at contributing to reaching environmental goals as well as fostering prospects 
for increased economic growth…From a technological perspective, a delineation of green 
technologies yields green energy supply and energy efficiency, but also green transportation, 
waste and material efficiency technologies, and water-related technologies. Green industrial 
policy, however, also requires strategies through which new technologies are complemented 
by organisational and institutional changes“. Another way of putting it is that green industrial 
policy requires not only supply-side interventions in support of technology development and 
investment but also a strong market creation component to stimulate the demand for clean 
technologies and sectors, in this case clean energy and other low-carbon technologies. The 
rationale is that ambitious demand-side support will translate into economic advantages 
within an emerging low-carbon economy (Fankhauser et al., 2013; Quitzow, 2013; Quitzow et 
al., 2014; SRU, 2002; Walz and Schleich, 2009).   
Climate-related industrial policy can be observed at all levels of the European governance 
system and represents an important motor of reinforcement in the context of multi-level 
governance. Moreover, as will be shown in the following section, it can be frequently 
observed how higher levels of government, in particular the European Commission, employ 
policies explicitly directed at stimulating such local level action, representing an important 
enabler of multi-level reinforcement.  
3. The case of the European Union 
In terms of both targets and outcomes, the EU remains an international frontrunner in climate 
policy. Its recently agreed target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030 
represents the most ambitious pledge among industrialized countries. Similarly, the already 
realized greenhouse gas reduction exceeds the achievements of all other major countries and 
world regions. The reduction between 1990 and 2014 was 23 percent. The Kyoto-target of the 
EU 15 has been surpassed (Figure 2) and the target for 2020 already nearly achieved.
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Moreover, the share of renewable energy has been increasing steadily. From 2000 to 2014 the 
capacity of wind power increased by 116.7 GW, solar power by 87.9 GW. Coal power (net) 
capacity was reduced by 24.7 GW in the same time (EWEA 2015). In 2014 renewables 
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 It should be noted that performance has not been equally high across all targets. Targets for energy efficiency 
and renewable energy as share of total primary energy consumption have not been reached. 
accounted for 79 percent of new electric power capacity, up from 57 percent in 2008 and 71 
percent in 2011 (REN21 2014). As depicted in figure 1, the EU holds a clear leadership 
position in this arena.  



















Source: REN 21 2009-2015 
In terms of climate policy measures, the introduction of the European Union’s Emission 
Trading Scheme (ETS) represents the most visible and comprehensive policy action. As the 
first large-scale scheme of its kind, it has received broad international attention and has 
represented an important learning ground for the policy instrument. In terms of its impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions, however, it has been a disappointment. Studies suggest that the 
instrument has had no significant impact on emission reductions, and the low prices for 
certificates suggest that this is unlikely to change in the near future (Laing et al., 2013).  
Explanations for the relatively strong performance of the European Union on climate change 
must, therefore, be sought elsewhere. Rather than the result of one strong, centralized 
instrument, it is rather the outcome of mutually reinforcing dynamics at different levels of 
governance. It is supported by an increasingly multi-level approach to low-carbon 
development policy at the European level. In the following, we describe the main elements of 
this multi-level system, placing particular emphasis on the role of the sub-national level and 
the corresponding policies at the EU level in support of local level initiatives. 
3.1.The green opportunity structure of the European Union:  a platform for the 
diffusion of policy innovation across member states 
The achievements of the EU’s climate and energy policy can be partly explained by an 
opportunity structure, which often enables environmental and climate policy innovation. 
Important elements of this opportunity structure are a number of environment-related articles 
in the legal framework of the EU (De Sandeleer 2014), including of the principle of a “high 
level” of environmental protection (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 
3.3) There are also green political parties in several member states and in the European 
Parliament. Some member states have strong public media, or relatively strong local 
communities. To a certain degree the EU has turned the “free European market” into a market 
with relatively effective environmental framework conditions. The formal avenue of the 
European Union’s legislative process, aimed at the harmonization of environmental regulation 
within the context of the single market, has represented an important institutional mechanism 
of multi-level reinforcement. Environmental policy innovation in member states can with a 
certain probability become a European regulation. Under certain conditions, the European 
Commission can allow member states to maintain or introduce “more stringent protective 
measures” of environmental policy to promote harmonization. When a member state is 
authorized to do this, “the Commission shall immediately examine whether to propose an 
adaptation to that measure” (i.e. an adaptation to the pre-existing measure at the EU level) 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Art. 114.7). This can lead to an up-scaling of national 
best practice or environmental policy innovation. Climate policy is part of the EU 
environmental policy (Art 191).  
The potential Europeanization of a national measure can stimulate regulatory competition 
between member states to become the frontrunner of a European regulation (Héritier et al. 
1994, Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007). In general there is the possibility of lesson-drawing by the 
European Commission based on empirical best practice (rather than more time-consuming 
experimentation) and with political and technical support from frontrunner member states. 
The UK emission trading scheme (2002) may be taken as an example. It was also intended to 
deliver ‘first mover advantages’ to UK companies before the introduction (2005) of the EU 
emission trading scheme (Rayner/Jordan 2011). Other examples are the UK Energy 
Efficiency Commitment (2002) and the German Renewable Energy Law (2000), both of 
which were followed by EU Regulations (2001, 2012). 
Complementing its formalized legislative process, the European Union frequently functions as 
a forum for benchmarking and lesson drawing among member states in a framework referred 
to as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). In the 2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies, European leaders have not only agreed a domestic greenhouse gas reduction 
target for the year 2030 of at least 40% compared to 1990 and at least 27% for renewable 
energy and energy savings. This 2030 policy framework also aims to make the European 
Union's economy and energy system more competitive, secure and sustainable and (in the 
spirit of OMC), it includes a new governance system based on national plans for competitive, 
secure and sustainable energy as well as a set of key indicators to assess progress over time 
(European Commission, 2014).     
3.2.Climate and energy policy as industrial policy: sectoral support to low-carbon 
development 
This opportunity structure for multi-level reinforcement is supported by the Commission’s 
low-carbon industrial policy. Industrial policy has a long tradition in the EU. After a period of 
neo-classical laissez-faire (e.g. in the Lisbon strategy, 2000), there was a revival of industrial 
policy under the umbrella of the green economy (Walz 2015, Pianta 2015). Low-carbon 
development is the most prominent aspect of this approach. As early as 2007, the European 
Commission published a communication titled “Renewed EU industrial policy in times of 
climate change and globalization“. It aimed to „[s]timulate the development and 
commercialisation of low carbon and energy/resource efficient technologies, products and 
services, for example by developing lead markets and creating incentives for frontrunners“ 
(EU Commmission, July 4, 2007).  
This sustainable industrial policy approach was further developed and upgraded in the context 
of the “Europe 2020” strategy (European Commission, 2010). Its flagship initiatives entitled 
“An industrial policy for green growth” and “Resource-efficient Europe”, explicitly target 
green industrial objectives (including the „shift toward a resource-efficient and low-carbon 
economy“). The EU has also linked its 2020 climate and energy package (2009) to the goal of 
promoting green growth, jobs and competitiveness (EU Commission 2015). These high-level 
strategic objectives are underpinned by a mix of demand- and supply-side policies. On the 
demand-side, they include relevant regulations to be implemented at national and sub-national 
levels, e.g. the Renewable Energy Directive (2009); national targets for non-ETS sectors such 
as housing, agriculture, transport or waste; the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012), the Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (2010), including  regulation for new buildings (“nearly 
zero energy” by the end of 2020).  
On the supply-side, the “Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050” sketches 
out an investment program of about €270 billion with an expected additional employment of 
1.5 million (EU Commission 2011). Moreover, the European Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET-Plan) promotes the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies by 
coordinating research and supporting the mobilization of financial resources for investment. 
Implementation of the SET-Plan includes the European Energy Research Alliance, which 
seeks to align the programming of research organizations with the SET-Plan priorities, as well 
as the European Industrial Initiatives, which represent large-scale collaborative technology 
development programs for various low-carbon energy technologies. Additionally, the EU has 
created facilities under the auspices of the European Investment Bank (EIB) for the financing 
of low-carbon demonstration projects with funding from the sale of carbon allowances. The 
first program known as NER300 channeled over €2 billion from the sale of 300 million 
carbon allowances into low-carbon energy projects. The successor program NER 400 will 
channel the proceeds of 400 million carbon allowances into low-carbon projects in the energy 
and industrial sector. In addition, the EIB has committed to direct at least 25 percent of its 
lending to so-called “climate action projects” (including mitigation and adaptation). 
(European Investment Bank, 2015). 
3.3.Supporting multi-level reinforcement at the local level 
Complementing these sectoral policies, activities explicitly aimed at mobilizing climate action 
at the sub-national level via its Regional Policy have gained increasing relevance in recent 
times. The EU’s Committee of the Region has established the concept of multi-level 
governance as a guiding vision for EU Regional Policy. Its aim is to make the “European 
Union's actions more effective by establishing a new culture of inter-institutional and political 
cooperation” (Committee of the Regions, 2012:2). In this spirit, EU Cohesion Policy for 2014 
to 2020, accounting for approximately one third of the total EU budget, requires the 
development of so-called Partnership Agreements with the active participation of regional and 
local authorities as well as other local stakeholders (van den Brande, 2014). Moreover, 
Cohesion Policy is now explicitly aligned with the EU’s 2020 strategy and serves as a vehicle 
for its implementation (European Commission, 2013). Correspondingly, climate change 
adaptation and mitigation and low-carbon development represent key elements of the 
investment priorities agreed for in the Cohesion Policy for 2014 to 2020.  Based on these 
investment priorities, Member States and regions are now required to develop so-called smart 
specialization strategies. The vast majority of the emerging strategies explicitly address 
climate change and sustainable energy (European Commission, 2015). Two-thirds of regions 
have chosen energy as a priority (Wiesenthal and Nill, 2015).  
In addition to the traditional channel of Cohesion Policy, DG Energy launched the „Covenant 
of Mayors“ in support of the implementation of the 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package. It 
is recognized as an explicit instrument of multi-level governance “where common objectives 
and support are fixed at the EU level, but action takes place at the local level.” (Cerutti et al., 
2013). The Covenant of Mayors has proven successful, particularly in the Southern European 
member states. It now has over 6,500 signatories representing 211 million citizens. More than 
4800 signatories have developed so-called Sustainable Energy Actions Plans. According to an 
assessment in 2013, the average CO2 reduction of the agreed targets (2020) is 28% (Cerutti et 
al., 2013). Members receive technical support from the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre for developing and monitoring their Sustainable Energy Action Plans. 
Financing of measures is supported by a variety of mechanisms under the umbrella of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Sustainable Energy Initiative. 
Horizontal learning and competition across signatories are stimulated by an official 
Benchmark of Excellence, which is also a database of best practice. The European Innovation 
Partnership for Smart Cities and Communities (previously Smart Cities Partnership Initiative) 
of the European Commission is a similar mechanism, focusing on the use of ICT in transport 
and energy management to support the EU’s climate targets.  
4. The dynamics of local level reinforcement in EU member states 
The multi-level approach to climate and energy governance at the European level is mirrored 
in the actual dynamics in individual member states. As demonstrated by the following 
empirical examples, local level initiatives are playing an important role both by reinforcing 
dynamics in pioneer countries and by filling gaps in a number of countries with weaknesses at 
the national level.  
4.1.Pioneer countries 
Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom, all leaders in climate policy, are exhibiting 
strong local initiatives, which are further bolstering national leadership and in some cases 
even surpassing national ambition. The four countries have achieved the highest GHG 
reduction rates. They also have the most ambitious GHG reduction targets for the period 
1990-2020/25 (Germany 40-45% by 2025, UK 50% by 2025; Denmark and Sweden 40% by 
2020). These ambitious climate strategies are the result of what Jänicke (2013) describes as 
“interactive cycles of climate-friendly innovation”, where initially unexpected advances in 
technology trigger  policy-feedback following market growth and innovation in relevant clean 
energy technologies (see Figure 2). In innovation research, these positive feedbacks between 
national sectoral policy and technological innovation have been referred to as “virtuous 
cycles” and processes of “cumulative causation” (Hekkert et al., 2007; Jänicke, 2012). In this 
paper, we argue that these processes are also characterized by important reinforcing 
mechanisms at sub-national levels of governance. In the following, we consider local level 
dynamics in the three countries. The German case, in particular, demonstrates how local level 
dynamics are increasingly linked to the mobilization of sub-national economic interests, 
which has had an important stabilizing effect for national renewable energy policy.  













Source: Based on data from Eurostat/EEA 2014 
Germany 
Germany’s climate policy had the special advantages that the breakdown of the energy-
intensive industry in the former GDR together with its lignite-coal based power supply 
reduced the fear of a radical change of the energy system. Already in 1987 a parliamentary 
Enquete Commission on climate policy was installed. Its conclusions and proposals (1990), 
which explicitly included other countries as well as the global context, had a strong impact at 
the European level. A first result was an ambitious GHG reduction target in Germany (minus 
25% by 2005/1990). This policy was based on a cross-party consensus (including pro-nuclear 
interests of the right-wing parties). Early on, Germany translated its environmental and 
climate policy into the language of industrial policy and “ecological modernisation” (OECD 
2007). It was a national policy with European and global ambitions (Jänicke 2011).  
It could rely also on earlier experiments at lower levels of governance. In the field of solar 
energy, the first cost-covering feed-in tariffs for solar energy were pioneered at the local level. 
In 1995, the Solarförderverein Aachen succeeded in establishing Germany‘s first solar feed-in 
tariff against the resistance of both the local utility and the regional (Länder) government. In 
the subsequent years, this model diffused to over 40 communities in Germany, frequently 
against the opposition of the local energy providers. It was based on this experience that the 
newly elected Red-Green government finally launched the 100,000 rooftop program in 1999. 
This was followed by a cost-covering feed-in tariff at the national level in 2004 (based on the 
revision of the Renewable Energy Act) and obligatory grid connection. In the ensuing phase 
of market growth, the State governments, in particular in Eastern Germany, offered attractive 
investment incentives, frequently financed with EU structural funds, to PV manufacturers. 
The resulting economic interests at the regional level led to strong action by several Länder 
governments in support of renewable energy deployment. When the federal feed-in tariff 
came under pressure in 2010 and 2012 (mainly due to increases in overall costs), Länder 
governments actively prevented more radical revisions of the Renewable Energy Act, 
blocking legislative proposals in the Bundesrat and hence effectively stabilizing renewable 
energy deployment in Germany.  
Further examples of pioneering activities by individual states have emerged recently (in 
Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Würtemberg). The state of Hesse 
intends to be “climate-neutral” (Hölscher / Radermacher 2013). Some States have introduced 
special climate-laws. The most remarkable development, however, has occurred at the 
municipal level. More than 140 municipal governments have formulated the goal of attaining 
100% of their electricity from renewable sources. Already 30 percent of the country is 
organized as 100%-renewable-energy regions, which have been created basically at the local 
level (BMU 2013). The number of people involved in this network has remarkably increased 
since 2010 (Figure 3). The private generation of green power, in many cases in the form of 
cooperatives, has proven to be a strong driver for this development, particularly after 2000. 
Figure 3: 100%-Renewable-Energy Regions in Germany 
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Denmark 
Denmark can be regarded as the motherland of clean energy transition in Europe. It has been 
the lead market for wind power. 1976 it introduced regular energy plans supporting renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. Already between 1980 and 2003 it reduced its consumption of 
fossil fuels by 10 percent. The domestic CO2 emissions have been reduced between 1988 and 
2003 by 17 percent. The export of clean energy technologies increased from €540 million 
(1992) to €4 billion (2003). Today Danish electricity production based on renewables 
accounted for 43.1 percent of domestic electricity supply (2012), and the country aims to 
achieve a 100 percent share by 2050. At about 50 percent, Denmark has the highest share of 
co-generation in Europe. Denmark’s adjusted greenhouse gas emissions show a reduction of 
28.3 percent from 1990 to 2014) (Danish Energy Agency, 2015). Climate policy remains 
conceived in terms of industrial policy. The Energy Strategy 2050 (adopted in 2011) 
underlines the advantages for Danish firms in the global market for low-carbon technologies 
(Danish Government 2011). Being already a strong exporter of clean energies, Denmark aims 
to be one of the three leading countries worldwide in this respect. 
From its inception, local level actors have played an important role in the Danish process of 
renewable energy development, frequently referred to as a combination of “bottom up – top 
down” action (Reiche, 2005; Mendonca et al. 2009). By 1992, more than 3,000 co-operative 
wind turbines were installed (Reiche 2005). Enabled by a supportive national renewable 
energy policy, citizen cooperatives remained important players, owning approximately 40 
percent of installed wind power capacity in 2002. Individual owners – primarily farmers – 
owned a similar share, while utilities accounted for only 20 percent of installed capacity 
(Gotchev, 2015). In addition, power from decentralized combined heat and power production 
(CHP) increased from 1 percent in 1990 to 30 percent in 2001 (Hvelplund, 2013). In other 
words, Denmark climate and energy strategy has been strongly linked to a process of 
decentralization, both in terms of generation and ownership.  
The importance of the Danish cooperative model has also survived a period with a highly 
unfavorable policy environment for investment by cooperatives between 2001 and 2008, 
coinciding with an sharp downturn in renewable energy deployment, following the election of 
a conservative government in 2001 (Mendonca et al., 2009). Due to strong path dependency 
of the Danish energy reform (see Jänicke in this issue), however, its strongly decentralized 
process of renewable energy deployment was revived in 2008. In 2013, the trading 
cooperative called Vindenergi Danmark (Vindenergi DK) accounted for 70 percent of traded 
electricity from onshore wind farms. Though not its original mission, Vindenergi DK, set up 
by the Danish association representing individual and cooperative owners of wind turbines 
(DK Wind), enabled Denmark’s cooperatives to respond to an abrupt switch to a market-
based tariff model. Since 2008, government support to renewables has been renewed, which 
has gone hand in hand with municipalities emerging as important actors in renewable energy 
policy. According to a survey in 2008, 63 of 93 responding municipalities were actively 
engaging in climate-related activities and 22 were planning to do so (Sperling et al., 2014). 
Finally, cities are emerging as important frontrunners in climate governance. Copenhagen and 
Aarhus intend to be climate-neutral (by 2025, respectively by 2030).  
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom had a special advantage in its climate policy. Power generation from 
coal was reduced early on for political reasons by the former Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher. This had “the completely unintended effect of lowering the UK’s emission 
throughout the 1990s” (Rayner / Jordan 2011). Therefore it was easier to establish a more 
ambitious climate policy. The country was a pioneer and promoter of the European emission 
trading scheme. The Climate Change Act (2008) was a pioneering policy innovation in 
Europe. The greenhouse gas reduction target for 2020 was increased several times. After 2005 
the Blair government conceived climate policy strongly as business opportunity. The focus of 
the country’s climate investment is on energy efficiency.  
In the UK, climate policy started mainly as a top-down approach. Moreover, the 
implementation of the Climate Change Act (2008) since the election of the Tory government 
in 2010 has been criticized for lowering its initial ambition (Lockwood, 2013). Nevertheless, 
it has helped stimulate substantial dynamics at the sub-national level. In particular in 
Scotland, the above-mentioned policy feedback of successful deployment of green electricity 
can be observed. Figure 4 shows the progressive increase of targets in response to the rapid 
achievements on the ground. It now has the target to meet 100 percent of electricity demand 
from renewable sources by 2020 (The Scottish Government, 2013). It also aims to achieve an 
11 percent share of renewables in the heat sector and a 10 percent share in the transport sector 
by 2020 (WWF, 2014). . Scotland’s greenhouse gas emissions target of 42 percent by 2020 
(Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009) exceeds the national target of 34 percent (Department 
of Climate and Energy, 2014). Scotland’s ambitious climate targets received unanimous 
support in the Scottish Parliament and are supported by the business community and a range 
of civil society organizations. It is further bolstered by a strong anti-nuclear stance of the 
Scottish society and government (WWF, 2014), and it is underpinned by a Low Carbon 
Economic Strategy, a key component of the government’s overall Economic Strategy (The 
Scottish Government, 2010).  
The UK is also relatively strong at the city level. According to a comparative study the UK is 
leading Europe in terms of the number of cities that have climate change mitigation or 
adaptation plans (Reckien et al. 2014). Most cities have ambitious climate policy targets. 
London’s GHG-reduction target exceeds the national target (60% by 2025/1990). Edinburgh 
plans to have a zero-carbon economy by 2050 (Heidrich et al. 2013). This has also an 
industrial policy dimension. Manchester has for instance the ambition to play a leading role in 
the global market for energy-efficient building technologies.  
  
Figure 4: Changes in Scotland’s renewable energy targets over time 
 
Source: WWF (2014) 
4.2.National laggards and sub-national drivers 
In the previous section, we discussed the role of local level reinforcement in the case of three 
national frontrunners of climate mitigation and market support for low-carbon technologies. 
The example of Poland shows that relevant sub-national dynamics are also beginning to take 
shape in laggard countries in terms of national climate policy. The country is a prominent 
opponent to many aspects of the European climate policy (together with the Eastern European 
Wisegrad Group). However, a survey conducted among the authorities of the Polish 
communes between August and October 2013 comes to the conclusion that there is „large 
enthusiasm for the development of dispersed power sources, especially solar and wind”. 
Moreover, they find that the interests are frequently “even exactly opposite to the interests 
expressed by the Polish government”. This is often related to opposition to government plans 
for the building of new lignite power plants (Ancygier and Szulecki, 2013). In 2009, a number 
of municipalities even held local referendums, in which citizens voted against the construction 
of new coal-based power plants (Skorupska, 2015). Cities such as Bielsko-Biala, which 
established its Energy Management office as early as 1997 and was the first Polish municipal 
government to establish a Sustainable Energy Action Plan within the Covenant of Mayors, are 
offering pioneering examples for others to follow.    
It is also noteworthy that by far the largest number of municipalities to have joined the 
Covenant of Mayors are from Spain and Italy, accounting for 87 percent of signatories and 79 
percent of Sustainable Energy Action Plans as  of May 2014 (Cerutti et al., 2013). Despite a 
high share of relatively small municipalities, this still represents approximately 36 percent of 
the population covered by the signatories and 29 percent of the population covered by 
municipalities with Sustainable Energy Actions Plans. This is a disproportionately high share 
relative to their combined share of 21 percent of the total EU population. It should also be 
noted that about 4 percent of signatories are not from EU member states. The over-
representation of Italian and Spanish municipalities suggests that the relatively ambitious 
renewable energy policies in these countries, which were then largely abandoned in the wake 
of the financial crisis, have helped stimulate significant local level activities. With the 
weakening of national support, these local governments now appear to seeking support at the 
European level. In other words, dynamics triggered by national policy seem to be reinforcing 
climate and energy governance by a combination of European and municipal action. 
4.3.Discussion of empirical examples 
The various cases demonstrate the importance of the sub-national level in multi-reinforcement 
in a number of different country contexts, including both national pioneers (UK, Germany, 
Denmark) and countries with less ambitious climate policy, like Poland, Spain and Italy. 
These cases reveal a number of different patterns of reinforcement. In the example of 
Germany’s solar sector, citizen-induced policy innovation at the municipal level was 
important at the early stages of development, spilling over onto the national level with the 
introduction of the 100,000 rooftop program and the provisions for solar energy in the 
revisions to the Renewable Energy Act introduced in 2004. This in turn mobilized investment 
both on the demand- (i.e. electricity generation from solar resources) and supply-side (i.e. 
manufacturing of solar modules, project development, etc.). In particular the latter has been 
translated into economic interests at the sub-national level, which were then articulated in 
political terms by Länder governments. In the Danish wind energy sector, municipal 
government was less involved in the process of policy innovation. However, citizens, 
organized in the form of locally embedded cooperatives and their national associations, have 
represented the backbone of the economic development of the sector. Municipalities have 
started to enter as players at a later stage, apparently responding to developments at the 
national and sectoral level. In the UK, Italy and Spain, climate and renewable energy policy, 
respectively, were initially pioneered at the national level with relatively weak sub-national 
dynamics. Resulting sub-national initiatives (in particular Scotland) are now surpassing 
national-level ambitions in the UK, while in Spain and Italy municipal actors are seeking to 
fill a vacuum left by abrupt policy changes at the national level. Finally, municipalities in 
Poland are showing signs of developing a progressive agenda on climate and renewable 
energy issues in the face of strong national level resistance.  
5. Conclusions 
This article explains the relatively high performance of the EU in climate and energy 
governance by two inter-related factors: (1) the mobilization of economic interests by 
conceiving climate policy in terms of industrial policy, and (2) multi-level reinforcement. The 
industrial policy dimension is equally present in the renewable energy-focused strategies in 
Germany and Denmark, and the energy efficiency centered approach in the UK. In all cases, 
the resulting mobilization of economic interests has created strong incentives for reinforcing 
climate action at the sub-national level. Simultaneously, sub-national governance is emerging 
as a locus of ambitious climate and energy policy in a number of laggard countries. Support 
from the European level represents an important support mechanism for these actors. 
 
This dynamic system of multi-level governance is most advanced in the EU compared to 
other world regions. It provides an opportunity structure for innovation and its rapid diffusion. 
It is a system of interactive learning from best practice and a “multi-impulse system” with 
impulses from different points of the system which can have a strong combined effect. 
Stagnation at certain levels or countries can be compensated on other levels and in other 
countries. Sub-national levels of governance are beginning to assume an increasingly 
important role in reinforcing climate governance. This is taking a number of different forms, 
depending on the particular national context.  As indicated, the importance of EU level 
support to sub-national action appears to most relevant in countries with relatively weak 
national climate policies. In Italy and Spain, in particular, it seems to be filling a gap left by a 
weakening of national level policies.  
 
This development of the multi-level model of climate governance has given the European 
climate system a certain independence from centralized EU decision making. It could make 
the EU system of climate governance comparably robust in times of recession or competing 
priorities, such as the Euro zone crisis or challenges related to the increasing number of 
refugees entering the EU.  
 
Central to this are the economic co-benefits, which have been explicitly addressed by the EU 
in terms of its industrial policy (IRENA 2016). Co-benefits mean that there is a change from 
burden-sharing to opportunity sharing and from norm-driven to interest-driven solutions 
(Schaik / Schunz 2012). The important implication is that an effective climate policy must not 
only rely on legal obligations but can also use voluntary mechanisms and support mechanisms 
at different levels of governance in support of policy experimentation and interactive learning. 
This shift towards interest-driven, opportunity-based and more voluntary approaches can also 
be observed in the new strategy of “progression over time” in the Paris Agreement (Art. 3, 
UNFCCC 2015). This is a shift of paradigm in the in global climate policy which seems to be 
an essential cause for the successful outcome of the Paris climate negotiations (Jänicke 2016). 
It may also help to implement the new dynamic COP 21 strategy of climate governance. 
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